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requiring acceleration of all payments due without a
discount reflecting the time value of money, violated 15
U.S.C. § 1667b(b). After its review of the claim, the
circuit court affirmed the lower court's decision and
held that Villasenor failed to state a cause of action.
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the
statute requires a factual basis to demonstrate that the
early termination charge was unreasonable in light of
anticipated or actual harm. Because Villasenor had not
terminated his lease, there was no basis for an allegation of harm.

Disclosures required
Finally, Villasenor alleged that Chrysler violated the
Consumer Leasing Act in two respects. First, he
contended that Chrysler had not disclosed the complete
formula it used in calculating early termination charges,
thus violating 15 U.S.C. § 1667a(11). Second, he
contended that Chrysler failed to identify all warranties
provided by the manufacturer to the lessee, thus
violating 15 U.S.C. § 1667a(6). On review, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court on both of these
counts, holding that Villasenor stated a valid claim
under both sections.
Villasenor, on appeal, contended that the formula
Chrysler used for the early termination charge disclosed

in the lease differed from the formula it used regularly
in practice. Specifically, he claimed that the formula
given in the lease contained a reduction not utilized in
the actual computations made by Chrysler when a
penalty was assessed.
In its analysis of this issue, the circuit court first
turned to the statutory provision in question. The
Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1667a(11), requires
every lessor to provide a statement describing the
amount or method for determining any penalty or other
charge for delinquency, default, late payment or early
termination in each consumer lease. Although determining whether such a discrepancy existed was a matter for
the district court, the circuit court recognized that the
failure to disclose the entire formula for calculating
early termination charge was a technical violation of the
disclosure provision found in 15 U.S.C. § 1667a(11)
and other regulations. As such, dismissal of the claim
had been improper and the issue was remanded.
Villasenor also contended that Chrysler failed to
identify the warranties provided by the manufacturer to
the lessee, thus violating federal law. Specifically, he
contended that the Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1667a(6) requires the lessor to provide a statement
identifying all express warranties and guarantees made
by the manufacturer.
Pleasesee "Lessees' rights" on page 36

Requirement to split utility expenses actionable
By Michael Sullivan
In Legg v. Castruccio,642 A.2d
906 (Md. 1994), the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals held that a
landlord commits a deceptive or
unfair business practice under the
Maryland Consumer Protection Act
("CPA"), section 13-102 of the
Commercial Law Article of the
Maryland Code, by requiring a
tenant to obtain utility services
measured by a meter that, unknown
to the tenant, also services another
rental unit. However, a tenant
waives her cause of action if she
learns of the arrangement and
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consents to it. Moreover, the court
held that a tenant may sustain a
cause of action against her landlord
for breach of covenant of quiet
enjoyment, provided the tenant
complains about the situation and
the landlord fails to respond after a
sufficient period of time.

Separate accounts
In spring 1987, Deborah Legg
leased the first floor of a two-story
house from Sadie and Peter
Castruccio on a verbal, month-tomonth basis. At that time, the
Castruccios informed Legg that she

would have to establish her own gas
and electric account with the local
utility company. However, they
failed to inform her that her utility
bill would include charges for both
the first and second floor apartments.
Subsequently, the Castruccios
leased the previously unoccupied
second floor apartment to David
Bushell, who orally agreed to pay
Legg one-fourth of her utility bills.
Throughout his tenancy, Bushell
regularly paid his share for utilities.
In summer 1988, the Castruccios
leased the second floor apartment to
Julie Papilon and Vinnie Harcourt.
The landlords orally informed the
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prospective tenants that they would
have to pay one half of Legg's utility
bills. Papilon and Harcourt subsequently made an oral promise to
Legg to pay one-half of her utility
bills. The Castruccios documented
this agreement by recording a note
in their rent ledger.

Tenants decide to leave
Beginning in July 1990, about
two years after the initial agreement
with Legg, Papilon and Harcourt
stopped paying for most of their
utility usage. Between July 1990 and
December 1991, they accumulated
$2,155.36 in utility expenses.
Papilon and Harcourt paid Legg
$140 of this amount.
During this period, Legg complained to the Castruccios, asking
that separate meters be installed in
the house. Although the landlords
stated that they "would take care of
it," they took no action against
Papilon and Harcourt and did not
install separate meters.
In early November 1991, Papilon
and Harcourt moved out of their
apartment. They left an outstanding
utility bill of $2015.36. At that time,
Legg was in arrears with the utility
company, in part because of the
upstairs tenants' delinquency.
Subsequently, the Castruccios
brought suit against Legg in the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County for repossession of rented
property. On the day of trial, Legg
filed a counterclaim against her
landlords. In her amended complaint, she sought rent abatement,
damages, and attorney fees from the
Castruccios, alleging that they had
illegally leased her an unsafe
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apartment in an unlicensed multiple
dwelling. She also alleged that the
Castruccios had engaged in unfair or
deceptive trade practices in the
rental of consumer property by
representing that the upstairs tenants
in her building would pay one-half
of the utility expenses.
On May 5, 1991, both parties
resolved all of the disputed issues
except whether the Castruccios had
any responsibility for Legg's unpaid
utility bills. On this issue, the trial
court held that the Castruccios
refusal to pay for the utilities of the
upstairs tenants did not: (1) create a
dangerous defect; (2) create an
illegal appropriation of utility
charges; (3) breach the covenant of
quiet enjoyment; (4) breach an
agreement to pay for such service;
or (5) violate the CPA as a deceptive
or unfair trade practice or the
Federal Trade Commission ("Frc")
consumer unfairness doctrine.
Legg appealed the lower court's
ruling, presenting three questions for
review by the Maryland Special
Court of Appeals. These included:
whether a landlord's failure to
inform a tenant that she was
responsible for all charges on her
utility meter, including those of
other tenants, violated the CPA;
whether a landlord's burdening of
one tenant with the potential utility
bills of another tenant violated the
CPA; and whether a landlord,
through such a burdening, breached
the covenant of quiet enjoyment.

Actual loss required
The CPA was designed to protect
consumers from unfair or deceptive
business practices, including certain
practices involved in apartment

leasing. For a private consumer to
sustain a cause of action under the
CPA, she must demonstrate an actual
injury or loss resulting from an
activity prohibited by the statute.
This requirement serves, in part, to
discourage consumers from bringing
CPA claims to harass or coerce
merchants.
Legg first asserted that the
Castruccios deceived her by leasing
the first floor apartment without
notification that her utility bill
would include the usage of the
second floor apartment. She contended that such behavior constituted a "failure to disclose a material
fact," and violated the CPA's
proscription of deceptive business
practices. Citing Golt v. Phillips
Bros. &Assocs., 517 A.2d 328 (Md.
1986), Legg contended that a fact
was material if "a significant number
of unsophisticated consumers would
attach importance to the information
in determining a choice of action."
In its analysis, the court agreed
with Legg, concluding that a
significant number of unsophisticated consumers would attach
importance to whether their utility
bill would include the utility usage
of other tenants. It held that the
Castruccios, by not disclosing this
fact to Legg prior to the beginning
of her tenancy, had violated the CPA
for failing to state a material fact.
Nevertheless, the court dismissed
the claim, finding that Legg had
waived her right to recover by
remaining on the premises and
consenting to the billing arrangement. Because of this waiver, any
injury that Legg sustained resulted
from the other tenants' delinquency,
and not from the landlords' failure
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to disclose information about the
rental situation.
Additionally, the court also
dismissed Legg's argument that the
Castruccios had a duty, under the
deceptive business practices
doctrine, to warn her of what would
happen if she did not pay her utility
bills. It determined that such a duty
rightly belonged to the utility
company. Moreover, the court also
dismissed Legg's contention that the
Castruccios' statement that "they
would take care of it" meant Legg
was not responsible for the upstairs
tenants' share of the utility bill. The
court ruled that this statement was
simply a response to Legg's request
for separate utility meters.

Claim fails test
Legg then asserted that, in
violation of the CPA's proscription of
unfair business practices, the
Castruccios conditioned her continued tenancy on whether she accepted the burdens and liabilities of
having other tenants' utility usage
on her meter. In deciding this issue,
the court employed the FTC's test for
unfair business practices, finding it
consistent with the goals and
philosophy of the CPA. According to
this test, an "unfair business
practice" is one that is substantial, is
not "outweighed by any
countervailing benefits to consumers
or competition that the practice

produces", and causes "injury that
consumers themselves could not
have reasonably avoided."
Applying the FrC test, the court
dismissed Legg's unfair business
practices claim. It found that Legg
could have reasonably avoided
injury by moving out of the apartment. Moreover, considering her
month-to-month lease and the
availability of similar apartments in
the area with separate utility
metering, Legg could have done so
with relative ease. Corrective action,
the court explained, is only necessary to deter seller behavior that
effectively prevents a consumer
from making her own decisions.
Please see "Utility expenses" on page 36

Minnesota statutes protect rent-to-own customers
ByAimee Latimer
In Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 544 (Minn.
1994), the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that rentto-own transactions are consumer credit sales as
defined by the Minnesota Consumer Credit Sales Act
("CCSA"), sections 325G. 15 and 325G. 16 of the

Minnesota Statutes. It also held that such transactions
are subject to the interest rate limitations of the state's
general usury statute. Furthermore, the supreme court
found that the Rental-Purchase Agreement Act
("RPAA"), sections 325F.84 to 325F.98 of the Minnesota
Statutes, did not repeal the CCSA but rather provides
remedies, that in conjunction with the CCSA, are
cumulative.

Rent-to-own customers pay more
D.E.F. Investments, Inc. ("DEF") and its subsidiaries
operate several rent-to-own dealerships in Minnesota.
DEF uses standard forms to lease a variety of consumer
goods to its customers. Under these contracts, a
customer agrees to rent an item on either a weekly or
monthly basis. At the end of the selected term, the
customer has the option to renew the contract. Addi-
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tionally, if the customer has renewed the contract for a
specified number of terms, she obtains title and ownership of the item. In such cases, the total rental price
exceeds the fair market value price of the item.
Delilah Miller and Craig Stenzel each entered into
rent-to-own agreements with DEF that extended over
several years. Miller signed a DEF agreement for a used
washer and dryer with a stated purchase price of
$800.75. According to her contract, she could acquire
ownership by making either 16 monthly payments of
$84.40 for a total purchase price of $1,350.40, or 69
weekly payments of $21.10 for a total purchase price of
$1,455.90. Stenzel signed a similar contract for a
television with a market value of $470. According to
the terms of his contract, Stenzel could obtain ownership by making either 18 monthly payments of $47.70,
totaling a purchase price of $858.60, or 78 weekly
payments of $12.75, totaling $994.50.
On April 7, 1992, Miller and Stenzel filed a classaction lawsuit in state court against DEF. In their
complaint, they alleged that: (1) DEF's rent-to-own
agreements were consumer credit sales as defined by
the CCSA; (2) DEF violated the CCSA by failing to treat

the agreements as consumer credit sales; and (3) DEF
committed usury in violation of the state's usury statute.
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Subsequently, Miller and Stenzel moved for partial
summary judgment, requesting a declaratory judgment
that DEF'S contracts constituted credit sales. DEF then
moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court
to dismiss the usury claim.
The district court certified the plaintiff class and
granted its motion for partial summary judgment,
declaring that rent-to-own contracts constituted
consumer credit sales. The court also granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs on the usury claim, reserving
the amount of damages for the trier of fact.
After granting discretionary review, the court of
appeals reversed the district court. It found that DEF'S
rent-to-own agreements were neither consumer credit
sales nor usurious. Additionally, the appellate court
suggested that the recently enacted RPAA substantially
conflicted with the CCSA and that the RPAA was controlling. Miller and Stenzel then appealed to the Minnesota
Supreme Court.

Court defines rent-to-own agreements
On review, the Minnesota Supreme Court first
considered whether the CCSA defined rent-to-own
agreements as consumer credit sales. The court noted
that at common law, rent-to-own transactions were
treated as leases, rather than sales. This was because
the customer was never bound to pay the total purchase
price of an item and could terminate the "lease" at any
time by returning the item. The supreme court suggested that the state legislature indicated its intent to
move away from this rule and subject such terminable
leases to consumer credit sales protection laws when it
amended the CCSA in 1981. This amendment defined
certain terminable leases as a "sale of goods" if the
contracts met three criteria: (a) the bailee or lessee has
the option to renew the contract by making the payments specified in the contract, (b) the contract obligates the bailor or lessor to transfer ownership of the
property to the bailee or lessee for no other or a
nominal consideration upon full compliance by the
bailee or lessee to renew the contract, and (c) the
payments contracted for by the bailee or lessee,
including those payments pursuant to the exercise of an
option by the bailee or lessee to renew the contract, are
substantially equivalent to or in excess of the aggregate
value of the property and services involved.
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Turning to the case at hand, the court found that
DEF'S rent-to-own contracts satisfied each of the above

requirements and therefore constituted a "sale of
goods." Furthermore, it held that such transactions were
consumer credit sales because the buyer was not
required to make full payment when acquiring possession of an item, but could pay for it over a period of
time. Moreover, the court stated that the term "credit"
must be interpreted liberally to further the goal of the
CCSA, which is consumer protection. It concluded that
the legislature, in amending the Act to include the
definition of certain terminable leases as "sales,"
intended for these transactions to be protected under the
CCSA.

Company violated usury law
The Minnesota Supreme Court then addressed the
issue of whether DEF violated Minnesota's usury law.
On its behalf, DEF argued that its rent-to-own transactions were not usurious because the first two common
law elements of usury, forbearance of debt and an
absolute obligation to repay a principal amount, were
not involved in the disputed contracts. Furthermore,
DEF contended that the rent-to-own customer neither
incurred any debt nor was required to pay a principal
amount.
Although the court agreed with DEF's assertions, it
nonetheless concluded that DEF'S transactions were
usurious. It declared that by amending the CCSA to
define rent-to-own agreements as consumer credit sales
for all purposes, the Minnesota legislature intended to
extend to rent-to-own consumers the same benefits of
consumer protection laws, including the usury statute,
extended to those who entered into ordinary credit
agreements or installment sales plans. The court stated
that rent-to-own agreements were analogous to
ordinary credit agreements "in that they must either
forfeit possession of a good or continue paying for it."
Therefore, the first two elements of common law usury
were met by operation of statute under the CCSA.

Additionally, the court found that the third and
fourth elements of common law usury, charging an
excessive rate of interest and intending to "evade the
law at the inception of the transaction," were also met
in the present case. DEF acknowledged the large
difference between the price its customers paid to
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purchase goods through the rent-to-own agreements
and the actual value of the goods. However, it argued,
that it offered services, such as free delivery and
maintenance, which justified the higher cost, and this
presented a factual issue as to whether it charged
excessive interest. The court, however, found that DEF
offered no real evidence of the value of such services.
As a result, the court concluded that no reasonable
factfinder would find that the large disparity between
the prices DEF charged and the value of the goods and
services DEF offered fell within the amount allowed by
the usury statute.
Addressing the fourth element of usury, the court
stated that while DEF did not intend to violate the usury
law, it did intend to charge an excessive rate of interest,
which is all that is required by the statute. Therefore,
the supreme court concluded that that lower court
correctly found no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether DEF violated the usury statute and therefore
properly granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs
on their usury claim.
RPAA

and CCSA offer choice of remedies

Finally, DEF contended that the RPAA, enacted in
1990, effectively repealed the CCSA. In analyzing this

issue, the supreme court examined both the language
and legislative history of the RPAA and concluded that it
did not expressly repeal the CCSA. In so ruling, the court
noted in particular that the RPAA that stated that the
remedies offered "shall not be construed as restricting
any remedy that is otherwise available." The court also
observed that while the legislature had considered
repealing the CCSA and had even included such wording
in the original statute, it later adopted amendments that
deleted such provisions. Because the legislature did not
expressly state its intent to repeal the CCSA or restrict
the consumer's remedies to those listed in the RPAA, the
court held that the plaintiffs were not barred from
seeking a remedy under the CCSA. Furthermore, the
court did not find that the two laws were in irreconcilable conflict with one another. Rather, it held that the
two laws could be interpreted to offer cumulative
remedies for consumer protection.
In concluding, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that all rent-to--own transactions must be treated as
consumer credit sales, as defined by the CCSA, and that
rent-to-own customers were entitled to statutory
protections. It affirmed summary judgment for the
plaintiffs and remanded the case to the trial court for the
determination of damages.

Lanham Act does not cover consumer claims
By Travis Ketterman
In Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp.,
Inc., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir. 1993), the
Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
held that consumers do not have
standing to bring false advertising
claims under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
Additionally, the court held that the
1988 amendment to the Lanham Act
did not broaden its jurisdiction to
include consumer claims.
The Lanham Act, as enacted in
1946, regulates and protects
trademarks; in addition, it protects
persons engaged in commerce from
the "deceptive and misleading use of
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the marks." The 1946 statute
provided a cause of action for
persons engaged in commerce when
another person knowingly uses false
advertising in the merchandising of
goods and services. In 1988,
Congress modified Section 43(a) to
authorize "any person who believes
that he or she is likely to be damaged by such acts" to bring a cause
of action under the Lanham Act in
federal court. In a consolidated
appeal, the Third Circuit addressed
whether the original Lanham Act, or
its more recent modification, was
sufficiently broad to give standing to
consumers who did not assert any
commercial interest or injury.

In 1990, Sara Serbin and George
Baker purchased new automobiles in
separate transactions. At the time of
these purchases, each also purchased
a "Super Rust Protection" policy
from the defendants, Ziebart
International Corporation and
Ziebart Company (collectively
referred to as Ziebart). Subsequently, Serbin and Baker brought
suit against Ziebart in the U.S.
District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, alleging
that defendants' advertisements
about "Super Rust Protection"
contained false representations
which misled them into purchasing
the additional policy. Moreover, they
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